Sustained Russian Shahed Swarms: The War of Precision Mass Continues
In November, we explored the rapidly changing dynamics of the Russian military’s use of Shahed 136-style loitering munitions in the Ukraine conflict using Petro Ivaniuk's curated dataset on Russian missile strikes. The employment of large swarms of one-way attack (OWA) munitions like the Shahed represents one of the one of the many tactical innovations on display this conflict. However, in late summer 2024, Russian forces began to launch Shaheds in significantly higher numbers than at any other time during the conflict. In this update, we examine new data on Russian Shahed strikes from November 2024 through January 2025 to see if this trend of increasing salvo sizes has been sustained.
In our previous analysis, we noted that from 2022 until the late summer of 2024, the Ukrainian interception rate against Shahed strikes had been high, consistent, and stable. When launched at low rates, the Shahed's slow speed and large noise signature appear to make the drone a relatively easy target for various Ukrainian air defense systems. However, in August 2024, as Russian forces began rapidly increasing the rate and volume of Shahed launches, Ukrainian interception rates fell precipitously. At the time, we assessed that the Russian employment of these OWA drones in mass represented a key innovation in making loitering munition attacks a more effective form of long-range fires and that increased domestic production was a key factor in achieving sustained mass.
With updated data now available, we wanted to see if the Russians had sustained high rates of Shahed launches over the early winter months, and if the Ukrainians had been able to build additional air defense capacity against this new threat. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, the new data reveal that the Russians have continued to increase their Shahed launch rate over late 2024 levels. Moreover, the Ukrainians appear to have been unable to achieve the air defense gains necessary to return to the high shootdown rates they enjoyed earlier in the war.
The figure below demonstrates the continued increases in Russian monthly Shahed launches alongside the Ukrainian “new normal” interception rates. For example, in January 2024, the number of Russian Shahed launches hit a conflict-high of 2,641. Of note, the number of Ukrainian interceptions has also significantly increased since the beginning of the war, with the Ukrainians now conducting thousands of Shahed interceptions per month. January 2024 also represented a conflict-high in Shahed interceptions, with the Ukrainians shooting down 1,591 drones. Unfortunately, these gains in interception successes have simply not kept proportional pace with the new numbers of Russian OWA launches.
A clearer upward trend in Russian Shahed salvo sizes also emerges in the new data. The minimum Shahed salvo size has risen from 3 in September 2024 to 30 so far in 2025. Meanwhile, of the 48 Shahed attacks thus far in 2025, only 4 have had swarm sizes of less than 50 — the average attack size being about 88 and the median 81. This evidence suggests that Russia no longer considers smaller attacks to be a valid tactic.
A direct examination of Ukrainian shootdown rates across the conflict indicates that Ukrainian air defenses remain stuck in an interception-rate trough. We do note a positive change in the interception rate from December to January, and it is possible that the Ukrainians are turning the corner on their air defense capacity and effectiveness. However, more data will be required to confirm the presence or direction of any trend.
The rapid increases in Russian Shahed launches over the last few months raise questions as to whether this pattern is sustainable. According to recent CNN investigative reporting, a new drone factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia produced 5,760 Geran-2 drones between January and September 2024 (the Geran-2 is the domestic name for the Shahed). This factory — now believed to be the primary source for Shahed-style drones for the Russian military — may have also produced up to 10,000 new Gerbera drones in 2024. The Gerbera is a low-cost decoy version of the Geran-2, and has been increasingly launched alongside its armed counterpart to further stress Ukrainian air defenses, which likely cannot easily distinguish the difference. In the graphics presented above, it is assumed that the launch totals include both Geran-2 drones and Gerbera decoys in unknown proportions to one another, just as they would appear to Ukranian air defenses.
Using the total estimated production figures quoted in the CNN report, we can back into some rough monthly production totals for Geran-2 drones and Gerbera decoys. Assuming the rate of production for all drones and decoys is constant, we can estimate that the Alabuga plant produced a total of 7,680 Geran-2 drones in 2024 by scaling the Jan-Sep 2024 total of 5,760 drones by three additional months, giving us a per-month production rate of 640 OWA drones. Similarly, an annual production total of 10,000 Gerbera decoys suggests a production rate of 833 decoys per month.
Finally, a Ukrainian source featured in the CNN article suggested that in a Russian salvo of 150 Shahed-style drones, only 20 or 30 total OWA munitions would actually be launched, with the rest being decoys. For our purposes in estimating capacity, we’ll assume that in a given month, only 20% of the total launches represent Geran-2 drones. For simplicity, we’ll also make the conservative assumption that the Russians started 2024 with no existing drone inventory, and we’ll assume that any unexpended inventory can be stored from month to month. These calculations and assumptions give us the following 2024 production and expenditure estimates for Russian Shahed-style drones.
Several simplifying assumptions have been made here, but overall, these production and expenditure estimates look favorable from a Russian perspective. Even though the Russian military may be shooting more Gerbera decoys than it produces in certain months, there may be existing inventory to support the monthly launch rates observed since late summer 2024. Moreover, if we believe that Geran-2 drones only make up around 20% of every salvo, the Russians may now possess considerable reserves of these munitions — allowing them to reserve OWA capacity for their most critical targets.
Taken together, these updated data add additional evidence to our previous assessment that employing OWA munitions as precision mass represents an increasingly valid tactic to overwhelm and defeat air defenses. Furthermore, this tactic likely remains highly cost-effective for the Russians. At an estimated cost of $20,000 to $50,000 per munition, and at the production rates estimated in this analysis, the Russians can likely sustain the recent trend of large attacks and continue to impose heavy costs on Ukraine in the form of strikes and forced air defense expenditures.
The views and opinions expressed on War Quants are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or organization.
Mass produced cheaper weapons overwhelm by numbers very expensive fewer weapons, continued.
Solution : Anduril certainly has counter-drone drones (roadrunner) and aims for low cost mass production.
Solutions also should be AAA gun+ AI , and maybe DEW (laser, microwave). I can’t imagine CIWS is useless, I am well informed by practitioner even small arms and yes shotguns work with small suicide drones.
The common soldier must have violent agency (ability to fight back) or it’s over psychologically.